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NOTES
THE 1972 U.S.-SOVIET ABM TREATY: CORNERSTONE OF
STABILITY OR RELIC OF THE COLD WAR?
FRAMING THE ISSUE
Background and Modern Relevance of the 1972 ABM Treaty
Debate
With Cold War tensions running high in May of 1972, the United
States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed a treaty
limiting the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile
(ABM) systems.1 The ABM Treaty covered defensive systems
designed to "shield" their respective nations from nuclear missile
attack. In simple terms, the ABM Treaty allowed the United States
and the Soviet Union to deploy missile shields only within a 150
kilometer radius of their respective capital cities-Washington, D.C.
and Moscow. 2 The thinking on both sides of the negotiation table in
1972 was that an effective missile shield for either the United
States or the Soviet Union would remove the deterrent factor for the
side possessing the shield, and allow that side to launch a nuclear
"first strike" without fear of an effective response.3 This treaty
1. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435 [hereinafter ABM Treaty], reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw AND WoRLD ORDER 213 (Burns H. Weston et al. eds., 2d ed. 1990)
(containing the text of the ABM Treaty, as advised for ratification by the Senate on August
3,1972, ratified by President Richard M. Nixon on September 30,1972, and entered into force
on October 3, 1972).
2. ABM Treaty, supra note 1, art. HI (a). The treaty also allows for one "offsite" missile
shield to protect intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos. Id. art. III (b).1 3. See Jack Mendelsohn, History and Evaluation of the Role of Nuclear Weapons in the
Cold War, 31 CASEW. RES. J. INr' L. 609,614 (1999) (noting that "[alternatively, if defenses
were left unconstrained, if one side in a nuclear deterrent relationship sensed that the other
787
788 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:787
remained in effect throughout the remainder of the Cold War, and
served as one of the major stumbling blocks for President Ronald
Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) (commonly known as
Star Wars) in the 1980s. 4 Although the Reagan Administration
attempted to "reinterpret" the ABM Treaty, the conventional
wisdom of the day was that the SDI program was a violation of the
letter and spirit of the ABM Treaty.5 Ultimately, however, the ABM
Treaty survived the assaults of the Reagan Administration when,
for various reasons, the Administration abandoned its goal of
developing the SDI.
Nearly ten years after the fall of the Soviet Union, in the waning
months of the Clinton Administration, the debate over a national
missile defense system for the United States resurfaced as a
prominent part of America's political landscape.6 President Clinton's
was attempting to neutralize its retaliatory forces, then that side would build up its
retaliatory forces. In short, defenses against retaliatory forces risk provoking increases in
nuclear weapons.").
4. Donald G. Gross, Negotiated TreatyAmendment: The Solution to the SDI-ABM Treaty
Conflict, 28 HARv. INT'L L.J. 31, 67 (1987) (arguing that amending the ABM Treaty before
committing to the Strategic Defense Initiative was the only approach that could "satisfactorily
resolve the SDI-ABM Treaty conflict"); Pamela L. Meredith, The Legality of a High-
Technology Missile Defense System: TheABM and Outer Space Treaties, 78 Am. J. INTLL. 418,
423 (1984) (noting that "[dieployment of a nationwide defense system to protect against
ballistic missiles would not be consistent with the ABM Treaty").
5. Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, Testing and Development of 'Exotic"
Systems under the ABM Treaty: The Great Reinterpretation Caper, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1956,
1957 (1986) (characterizing the Reagan Administration's interpretation of the ABM Treaty
to insulate the SDI through the development and testing stages as "a gross distortion of both
the language and purpose of the Treaty"); Kevin C. Kennedy, Treaty Interpretation by the
Executive Branch: The ABM Treaty and "Star Wars" Testing and Development, 80 AM. J. INTL
L. 854, 864 (1986) (discussing the fact that the Senate, upon giving its advice and consent to
the ratification of the ABM Treaty, specifically believed that "[sipace-based ABM systems are
prohibited by Article V of the ABM Treaty"). This beliefwas confirmed by numerous witnesses
testifying before the Senate in 1972, including the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Defense. Id.
6. See David Hoffman & Charles Babington, ABM Issue Unresolved as Summit Ends;
Clinton, Putin Sign Pacts on Plutonium, Early Warning Unit, WASH. POST, June 5, 2000, at
Al (noting that President Clinton was considering a national missile defense plan as a way
of combating"the threat ofmissile attack by 'rogue' states, such as North Korea." The Russian
leadership vigorously opposed such a system as a violation of the ABM Treaty.); Roberto Suro,
Woes Undermined Missile Defense Cause; Clinton Weighed Test Failures, Development Delays
in Addition to Diplomatic Costs, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2000, at A4 (reporting on President
Clinton's decision to not go forward with the implementation of a national missile defense
program, despite the firm support of the plan by Secretary of Defense William Cohen. Among
the factors considered by the President was the unsuccessful test of the system in July of
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position on the missile defense system essentially abdicated to his
successor the decision concerning implementation.7
Almost immediately upon George Walker Bush's Inauguration as
the forty-third President of the United States on January 20, 2001,
his administration signaled a paradigm shift in United States policy
concerning national missile defense.8 In no uncertain terms, and
only fourteen days after his inauguration, President George W.
Bush's Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld announced that
"[tihe United States intends to develop and deploy a missile defense
designed to defend our people and forces against a limited ballistic
missile attack, and is prepared to assist friends and allies
threatened by missile attack to deploy such defenses."9 In the same
breath, Secretary Rumsfeld noted "that the [G.W.1 Bush
Administration was determined to proceed with an antimissile
defense of United States territory even if it could not overcome the
objections from the Russians, the Chinese and the Europeans. "1'
Additionally, President Bush quickly ordered the Pentagon to devise
a plan to implement a national missile defense shield, taking into
account "diplomatic, technological and financial difficulties." '
Thus, in the early months of the latter Bush Administration,
national missile defense has been a priority on a scale not seen since
the Reagan years. Six months after George W. Bush's inauguration,
2000, as well as the "diplomatic" up-front costs that would be incurred in light of Russia's
vehement objection to the system.).
7. PaisleyDodds, Putin, NATOAlliesPraise MissileDefense Decision, WASH. POsr, Sept.
2,2000, at A15 (noting that President Clinton said that he "will leave it to the next president
to decide when, or whether, to deploy a national missile defense").
8. See Michael R. Gordon, U.S. Tries DefusingAllies' Opposition to Missile Defense, N.Y.
Tims, Feb. 4, 2001, at Al (describing newly appointed Secretary of Defense Donald H.
Rumsfeld's trip to Munich, Germany to meet with European allies concerning the new
administration's defense policies).
9. Id.
10. Id. (noting that Secretary Rumsfeld "described a missile defense as nothing less than
a moral imperative").
11. Steven Lee Myers, Bush inFirst Step to Shrink Arsenal of U.S. Warheads, N.Y. TIM,
Feb. 9,2001, at Al. The article also quotes a senior administration official who stated:
You now have to manage the transition from the old world to the new world ...
[a]nd the new world, once we get there, would be one in which defense forces
play an important role in keeping the peace, in which you have offensive forces
that are properly sized and configured to deal with the new deterrent tasks,
rather than the deterrent tasks of 1972.
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the Bush Administration has repeatedly declared its intention to go
forward with a missile defense shield, with or without cooperation
from Russia and the international community.'2 Despite this
unequivocal stance, the new administration has waffled on the
question of the legal "binding/nonbinding" nature of the ABM
Treaty.' This question cuts to the heart of the question addressed
in this Note, for if the treaty has lost its legitimate "force of law"
there is no need for the United States to abrogate or withdraw from
anything. 4 As the new administration proceeds with the imple-
mentation of a national missile defense, it will be forced to deal
decisively with the ABM Treaty.'
This administration's position on national missile defense has
received a lukewarm reception from the larger international
community, Russia and some traditional U.S. allies. 6 French
president Jacques Chirac stated publicly in January 2001 that an
12. The second Bush Administration could hardly be clearer on this issue, with top level
executive officials (including the President himself) reaffirming the position publicly. See, e.g.,
Sharon LaFraniere, Rice Expects RussianAssent on Shield, WASH. PosT, July 27, 2001, at A27
(quoting National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice as stating "that the Bush
administration will pursue its program to build missile interceptors whether or not Russia
agrees to jointly withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty"); David E. Sanger, A
Day After Seeing Putin, A Harder-Line Bush Emerges, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2001, at A8
(quoting President Bush as stating that "[s]ince I feel it so strongly, if [the U.S. and Russia]
can't reach an agreement, we're going to implement" the test for a U.S. missile defense
system); Alan Sipress, U.S. Will Not Seek to Alter ABM Treaty, WASH. PosT, July 25,2001,
at A13 (noting that, in the absence of an agreement with Russia regarding the
implementation ofa U.S. missile defense system, the United States is willing to "move ahead"
unilaterally).
13. Gordon, supra note 8, at Al (reporting that Secretary Rumsfeld "suggested that
antimissile defenses could be reconciled with some arms control treaties, avoiding the
bluntness of comments he made in Congressional hearings--and even on the plane flying to
the conference-that the ABM treaty was an anachronism") (emphasis added).
14. The central thesis of this Note addresses the question of whether the ABM Treaty
remains viable as a matter of U.S. constitutional and international law. During the first seven
months of the second Bush Administration, national missile defense has received wide
treatment both by the media and by Bush officials themselves, and as a result, the issues
surrounding national missile defense have evolved rapidly. This evolution will likely continue
for at least the next two to three years; however, the legal status of the ABM Treaty itself will
remain a crucial underlying issue for the foreseeable future. This issue would retain its
importance even in the event of a unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the treaty, in that the Bush
Administration would undoubtedly have to answer to a skeptical international community.
15. Michael R. Gordon, 'Star Wars' and Europe: The Mood is Shifting, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
5, 2001, at A8 (observing that "the United States will need to amend or jettison the 1972
[ABMI Treaty to embark on a serious testing and development program).
16. Gordon, supra note 8, at Al.
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American missile defense "cannot fail to relaunch the arms race
in the world."' German defense minister Rudolf Scharping also
publicly questioned the plan, and while visiting Moscow, urged that
the ABM Treaty be preserved.' For its part, Russia, until recently,
vehemently opposed the idea of abandoning the ABM Treaty.'9 The
head of President Vladimir Putin's security counsel, Sergei Ivanov,
originally stated that the demise of the ABM Treaty would "result
in the annihilation of the whole structure of strategic stability and
create the prerequisites for a new arms race."20 Moscow has since
softened its stance somewhat, following a short meeting between
Presidents Bush and Putin at the G-8 talks in Genoa, Italy, in July
2001.21 Following this meeting, President Bush announced that the
two presidents had agreed to hold talks concerning the possible
linkage of the abrogation of the ABM treaty and bilateral reductions
of nuclear stockpiles.'
Despite this announcement, after parting company the two
presidents swiftly reiterated that there had been no major
breakthroughs on the issue of national missile defense at the G-8
meeting.2 Consistent with this, the United States has signaled its
determination to move forward. President Bush's plan for a national
missile defense gained momentum domestically after endorsements
by such political luminaries as Joseph Lieberman, John McCain,
and Henry Kissinger.24 As for the specter of another arms race with
Russia, Secretary Rumsfeld summed up the U.S. position by noting
that "[tihe idea of an arms race between the United States and
Russia ought not to be frontand center in our thinking .... [ilt is
something that is a leftover, a relic in our thinking."' In this vein,
the G.W. Bush Administration has attempted to reframe U.S.-
Russian relations by repeatedly and publicly stating that the two
17. Id atA8.
18. Id
19. Id-
20. Gordon, supra note 15, at A8.
21. David E. Sanger, Bush and Putin Tie Antimissile Talks to BigArms Cuts, N.Y. TIMEs,
July 23, 2001, at Al.
22. Id The Bush Administration has been explicit about the fact that these talks with
Russia are not "negotiations" in the Cold War sense, but rather simply "consultations."
23. Id.
24. Gordon, supra note 8, at A8.
25. Id. (quoting Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld) (emphasis added).
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nations are no longer enemies. Despite these assurances, the legal
status of the ABM Treaty is a time-sensitive issue. As for when the
U.S.'s development of a national missile defense system would
actually clash with the ABM Treaty, a White House national
security staff member stated in July 2001 that the shield's
development would conflict with the treaty "in a matter of months,
not years."27
Parameters of the Discussion
This Note first defines the legal parameters within which George
W. Bush and future presidents should consider the implementation
of a national missile defense system. In framing the issue properly,
the applicable international law governing treaties between
sovereigns,' as well as the U.S. Constitution's distribution of the
power to make treaties on behalf of the nation,29 must be examined.
Of equal importance is the historical context of the ABM Treaty
itself,3" the legislative history of the Senate's ratification of the
26. David S. Broder, Bush's Bet on Russia, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2001, at A17 (regarding
the effect of the agreement reached in Genoa between Bush and Putin, Broder states that
"[mlost of all ... Bush got through to people with the simple, oft-repeated statement that
'Russia is not the enemy of the United States"); For the Record- Bush's Bet on Russia, WASH.
POST, July 13, 2001, at A20 (commenting on an excerpt of remarks by National Security
Advisor Condoleezza Rice, in which she states, in part, that President Bush "has also made
clear that he believes that [the ABM Treaty] is a treaty that is anachronistic... a treaty that
enshrines our hostile relationship with [sic] Soviet Union rather than our promising new
relationship with Russia").
27. Tom Bowman, Missile Defense Test May Conflict with ABM Treaty in '02, BALT. SUN,
July 13, 2001, at 3A (quoting Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, the head of the Pentagon's
Ballistic Missile Defense Office, as stating that a ground-based missile shield could be used
"to meet an emergency threat" in the 2004 to 2006 time frame. It seems logical that the G.W.
Bush Administration would want tangible results on missile defense by the politically
significant date of 2004.).
28. See infra notes 39-43 and accompanying text (discussing the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter 1969 Vienna Convention],
reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 93 and other
applicable sources of "customary international law").
29. See infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the treaty
powers of the President and the Senate, respectively).
30. ABM Treaty, supra note 1; see also infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.*
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treaty,"1 and the history of the United States' response to the fall of
the Soviet Union in the winter of 1991.32
Overview of the Arguments
An analysis of the ABM Treaty debate within these parameters
delivers one conclusion: the current Bush and future adminis-
trations are not legally bound by the text of the ABM Treaty. Two
distinct lines of reasoning converge at this result. First, the ABM
Treaty became invalid upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union as
a matter of U.S. constitutional law.' Related to this premise is the
"clean slate" doctrine of treaty succession law, which requires both
parties to certain treaties to reaffirm those treaties after the demise
of one of the original parties. 4 If the United States did not reaffirm
the ABM Treaty pursuant to its own constitutional scheme, in
essence the treaty has not been reaffirmed as a matter of U.S.
constitutional law. The clean slate doctrine, when viewed in con-
junction with the U.S. constitutional scheme for treaty ratification,
is analogous to a contract law scenario, in which one of the original
parties to a contract dies, and thus is unable to perform.
Second, even if the clean slate rationale is rejected in this
instance, the "changed circumstances" doctrine allows the United
States to revisit the ABM Treaty. The states which emerged from
the Soviet Union in 1991 bear little resemblance to the powerful
empire facing President Nixon in May 1972. This difference, in
conjunction with the changing international nuclear threat dynamic
and the rise of so-called "rogue states," makes the imposition of the
original 1972 treaty terms on the United States unreasonable, 5
31. See infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text (analyzing the legislative history to show
what the Senate believed it was ratifying in 1972).
32. See infra notes 58-69 and accompanying text (specifically discussing President George
H. W. Bush's stance on the "transition" from the Soviet Union to the Russian Federation).
33. See infra notes 70-78 and accompanying text (explaining that the treatyis not binding
as a matter of constitutional law due to the lack of proper"Advice and Consent" from the U.S.
Senate following the demise of the Soviet Union in December 1991).
34. See infra notes 81-92 and accompanying text (discussing the clean slate doctrine of
treaty succession, as opposed to the "universal succession' doctrine, and explaining why the
clean slate doctrine is applicable to the ABM Treaty debate).
35. See infra notes 93-125 and accompanying text (noting the vast differences in land,
military prowess, economic viability, and stability between the Soviet Union of 1972 and
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pursuant to the changed circumstances doctrine outlined in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties."8
The theory that the United States is not bound by the ABM
Treaty has a basis in constitutional and international law. This,
however, is not the end of the debate. Many argue that there are
diplomatic and public policy reasons why the United States should
abide by a treaty which it is not legally bound to recognize as
legitimate. 7 This Note will address these arguments, as well as
offer policy reasons in favor of the United States' rejection of the
ABM Treaty.
OVERVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL TREATY LAW AND U.S.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW GOVERNING TREATY RATIFICATION
Applicable International Treaty Law
Treaties are agreements between two sovereigns. 9 In entering
into a formal treaty agreement, each party must be a "sovereign," or
"international person" able to properly enter into such agreements
on their own behalf.' Once two sovereigns have entered into such
modem-day Russia. This section will briefly address the changed circumstances which the
United States faces in the form of threats from rogue states, many of which now have nuclear
capabilities.).
36. See 1969 Vienna Convention, supra note 28.
37. See infra notes 131-44 and accompanying text (discussing reasons why the United
States, as a matter of policy, might want to abide by a treaty to which it is not legally bound,
including international balance of power considerations, U.S. concern over its reputation as
a trustworthy bargaining partner, and diplomatic reasons specific to the ABM Treaty).
38. See infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text (noting some of the policy reasons the
United States should disavow the ABM Treaty, including the rise of the rogue state threat,
the fall of the Soviet Union as a superpower, the extreme instability of the Russian military,
and the constitutional issue of the proper role of the Senate pursuant to the treaty power).
39. For a detailed discussion of the concept of treaties, see V.D. DEGAN, SOURCES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAw 355-514 (1997). Basically, Degan indicates that "[a] treaty consists in a
concordance of wills of two or more subjects of international law (i.e. international persons),
intended to achieve an effect in international aw by creating a legal relationship of rights and
duties for its parties." Id. at 357.
40. This issue was addressed by the 1969 Vienna Convention, supra note 28. Article 6 of
the 1969 Vienna Convention states that "[elvery State possesses capacity to conclude
treaties," and the issue of what constitutes a "State" for treaty purposes hinges on the
question of whether the State is the sovereign decision maker, empowered to enter into
international agreements with other sovereigns. DEGAN, supra note 39, at 363-64 (explaining
that sovereign states, as a matter of principal, possess general treaty-making power and
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an agreement, there is no more powerful source of international
law.41 Express treaties between two sovereigns solve, at least with
respect to the parties, many of the problems created by the nebulous
nature of customary international law.42 In regards to something as
sensitive as a ballistic missile agreement, the United States and the
Soviet Union were seeking the clarity of a formalized treaty."
addressing the situation of a "federal union," (such as the United States) by noting that there
is a'presumption that member States of a federation are not invested with the treaty-making
power," unless their federal constitution grants them this power).
41. PER SEVASTn, TaE BINDING FoRcE OF TREATIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw 21, 23
(1997) (noting that "[tireaties are by far the most important written instruments used to
regulate international transactions," and later explaining that "[u]nder international law, a
treaty creates international legal obligations, with corresponding duties of compliance and
remedies, including some forms of retaliatory measures in the event of a breach"). Id.
(emphasis added).
42. In the absence of express treaties, nations are bound by what is known as "customary
international law" in their dealings with other sovereigns. E.g., DEGAN, supra note 39, at 179
(discussing the fact that while "treaties can only create rights and duties for their parties on
their own, custom remains the main process in which rules ofgeneral international law arise,
modify, and terminate"). Furthermore, treaties between nations can themselves "evolve" into
customary international law. See Karol Wolfke, Treaties and Custom.Aspects of Interrelation,
in ESSAYS ON'THE LAW OFTREATIES 33 (Jan Klabbers & Rene Lefeber eds., 1998). Wolfke notes
that the drafters of article 38 of the 1969 Geneva Convention, when discussing the ability of
a treaty to become customary international law and therefore binding on third parties,
originallyincluded the language: "In none of these cases, however, can it properly be said that
the treaty itselfhas legal effects for third States." Id. (citations omitted). The final version of
article 38, however, does not include this language, instead stating that "[n]othing ...
precludes a rule set forthin a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a customary
rule of international law, recognized as such." 1969 Vienna Convention, supra note 28, art.
38. Commenting on this change, Wolfke notes that it "was not felt suitable to be spelled out
in the Convention." Wolke, supra, at 33. In other words, the fact that treaties cannot directly
bind third parties was regarded as so obvious as to not warrant inclusion in the Convention.
43. See DEGAN, supra note 39, at 186 (noting that "due to its fluctuating and unstable
character it is much more difficult to establish responsibility for breach of a customary rule
of international law than responsibility for violation of an obligation arising from a written
treaty"). The text of the ABM Treaty, supra note 1, bears this out. Both parties demanded a
clear delineation of the duties and rights of the other, as demonstrated in the unequivocal
language of article I, paragraph 2 of the Treaty which states that "[e] ach Party undertakes
not to deploy ABM systems for a defense ... of its country .... " IcL art. I. Article X
underscores the preeminent nature of the treaty in relation to other international law, by
stating that "[elach Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which
would conflict with this Treaty." Id. art. X.
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The Power to Make Treaties on Behalf of the United States
Pursuant to the U.S. Constitution
A second parameter shaping the ABM Treaty debate is the way
in which the U.S. Constitution allocates power to "make treaties" on
behalf of the United States. In keeping with the prevailing notion of
separation of powers, the Framers of the Constitution divided the
power to enter into treaties on behalf of the United States between
the president and the Senate." This constitutional power-sharing
scheme seeks to be both efficient by allowing the president to act
unilaterally in the arena of foreign affairs, and cautious by
demanding the "Advice and Consent" of the Senate.' Some
commentators have argued that, since the 1930s, "congressional-
executive agreements" have usurped the treaty-making power
delegated to the Senate by the U.S. Constitution.' Other prominent
commentators have noted that congressional-executive agreements
are, in effect, an improper intrusion into the Senate's "Advice and
Consent" role as set forth in the Treaty Clause.47 The issue of
44. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the president the "Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur").
45. See Louis HENiN, FoREIGN AFFAmS AND THE U.S. CONsTrrunON 35-37 (2d ed. 1996)
(noting that "[f]or the Framers, treaties were an essential element in international relations
and an indispensable means for safeguarding and realizing the vital interests of the United
States"). Professor Henkin further explains that in devising this power-sharing scheme the
Framers sought to strike a balance between the efficiency of giving the treaty power solely to
the president (which, the Framers believed, would make it "too easy" to make treaties on
behalf of the United States) and the "clumsy" nature by which Congress, because of its
deliberate style, would handle the sole power to make treaties. Id. For an in-depth
understanding of the Framers' original intent regarding the treaty power, see ROBERT T.
DELvIN, THE TREATY POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1996)
(providing an exhaustive study of the Framers' debates surrounding the allocation of the
treaty power).
46. For a detailed discussion of congressional-executive agreement phenomenon, see
Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995)
(explaining the modern trend, arising since the 1930s, which allows the United States to be
bound, just as it would be by a treaty ratified by two-thirds of the Senate, to international
agreements such as NAFTA or the WTO after only a simple majority vote of both houses of
Congress and signed by the President. These agreements are commonly called congressional-
executive agreements.).
47. For a response to Professor Ackerman's analysis of the congressional-executive
agreements, see Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-
Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1221 (1995) (arguing that
the Constitution is clear in its requirement of the vote of two-thirds of the Senate to bind the
796 [Vol. 43:787
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whether congressional-executive agreements are constitutionally
sound is beyond the scope of this Note, especially in light of the fact
that the ABM Treaty was originally advised for ratification by the
constitutionally required two-thirds of the Senate."
When considering the ABM Treaty debate, an important
distinction is that a treaty does not become "law," in the sense that
it is binding on the United States, until it has been both signed by
the president and ratified by two-thirds of the Senate.49 Thus, when
studying the present viability of the ABM Treaty, the events and
circumstances which led the President to enter into the treaty, as
well as the legislative history behind the Senate's vote to ratify the
treaty, must be examined.50
The ABM Treaty Revisited
Circumstances Surrounding President Nixon's Decision to Enter
into the ABM Treaty
In 1972, the world was in the grips of the Cold War; "mutually
assured destruction" was the order of the day.5 ' The United States
was still involved in the Vietnam conflict, and the foreign affairs
nation to a treaty).
48. See ABM Treaty, supra note 1. The U.S. Senate ratified the ABM Treaty on August
3, 1972.
49. HENKIN, supra note 45, at 186 (quoting Justice Holmes in Missouri v. Holland, 252
U.S. 416 (1920), in which Holmes stated that treaties are declared to be the supreme law of
the land "when made under the authority of the United States"). Henkin notes that Holmes
believed that a treaty becomes law if it meets the substantive requirements of the
Constitution: namely, Presidential signature coupled with the advice and consent of two-
thirds of the Senate. Id.
50. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text (discussing the circumstances
surrounding President Nixon's decision to enter into the ABM Treaty, and the legislative
history concerning the Senate's Advice and Consent vote).
51. For a discussion of the international climate of this era, see RE-VIEWNG THE COLD
WAR: DoMEsnc FACTORS AND FOREIGN PoLicY iN THE EAST-WEST CONFRONTATION 127-48
(Patrick M. Morgan & Keith L. Nelson eds., 2000). Chapter 6 of this collection of essays is by
Keith L. Nelson, entitled Nixon, Kissinger, and the Domestic Side of Ddtente, and describes
President Nixon's approach to Soviet relations during the time period leading up to the ABM
Treaty. Referring to the Moscow summit which produced the ABM treaty in May of 1972, one
commentator noted that "in terms of sheer complexity and scope, this summit meeting... was
an unprecedented contrast from the previous five summits following World War U."Id at 138
(quoting JOAN HOFF, NIXON REcoNSIDERED 203 (1974)).
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stance of the United States centered around arresting the spread of
communism, and with it the threat of Soviet dominance.52 The
Soviet Union, for its part, had committed its entire infrastructure
to achieving military and nuclear superiority over the United
States.' Thus, the stage upon which President Nixon and the U.S.
Senate were operating in 1972 was one fraught with tension and
fear of the Soviet nuclear threat.
Legislative History of the Senate Ratification of the ABM Treaty
When the ABM Treaty came before the Senate for ratification,
there was considerable discussion about what types of anti-ballistic
missile systems the agreement covered.54 The Senators expressed
concern over the types of systems which would be covered, as well
as directly addressing the issue of future space-based laser
programs55 -an issue that would resurface with President Reagan's
SDI program.56 For purposes of analysis of the modem-day ABM
Treaty debate, the principal aspect is that the Senate, in 1972,
agreed to ratify the ABM Treaty in the context of the Cold War, and
with the utmost consideration of the Soviet threat as they saw it at
the time.57 Stated differently, the Senators viewed the Soviet threat
through the lens of a bipolar world dominated by two opposing
nuclear superpowers. American leadership of this period was only
too aware of the price attached to winning the Cold War, having
suffered through a decade of increasingly unpopular military
involvement in Vietnam. As such, the nuclear balance-of-power
between the United States and the Soviet Union was of the utmost
52. See ia at 134 (describing the bipolar tensions and domestic factors facing President
Nixon during the early 1970s that ultimately led to the ABM Treaty).
53. See id; see also infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text (outlining in detail, from
previously secret CIA documents, the nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union during this time
(in the context of a discussion of the "changed circumstances" doctrine)).
54. See Kennedy, supra note 5, at 862-66 (discussing the Strategic Arms Limitation
Agreements Hearings).
55. Id. at 864-65.
56. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 5.
57. See Kennedy, supra note 5. The Senate was willing to make these concessions based
in large part on the fear that the Soviet Union might develop a successful ABM system first,
thus giving it the ability to launch an offensive strike against the United States, unfettered
by the threat of retaliation.
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concern. In 2001, ten years after the fall of the Soviet Union, it is
easy to forget that, in 1972, the world was living with the very real
threat of a U.S.-Soviet nuclear war.
THE U.S. RESPONSE TO THE FALL OF THE SOVIET UNION IN 1991,'
AND THE APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CONSEQUENCES
Executive Branch Response to the Fall of the Soviet Union
In the context of the ABM Treaty debate, the U.S. government
response to the fall of the Soviet Union in December of 1991 is
critical. International law dealing with successor states hinges
largely on the recognition of the duties of new states by the original
parties to the Treaty. Thus, the U.S. response, coupled with the
actual transition from the Soviet Union to its successor states, could
determine to whom, if anyone, the ABM Treaty continues to apply
in 2001.
At the end of the Cold War, the George H.W. Bush
Administration sought to support the Gorbachev democratic
movement within the confines of encouraging a stable transition
from the former Soviet Union to the resulting independent states or
federations."8 This was a predictable and necessary response, in that
it was clearly in the best interests of the United States to have
continued central leadership of the Soviet nuclear arsenal.
Moreover, President George H.W. Bush had formed a personal
relationship with Mikhail Gorbachev, 9 and was interested in
seeing Gorbachev's reforms result in an orderly transformation to
58. For a first-hand account of U.S. decision making during the fall of the Soviet Union,
see GEoRGE BusH & BRENT ScowcRoFT, A WoRLD ANSFORMED 493-561 (1998). This book
contains entries from President George H.W. Bush's private diary concerning the fall of the
Soviet Union, and accounts of telephone conversations between President Bush and Boris
Yeltsin or Mikhail Gorbachev as the transformation of the Soviet Union was occurring. The
book underscores the importance the United States placed on an "orderly" transfer of power
from the old regime to the new, and thus explains the reasoning behind the Executive's
position on treaty succession to arms control agreements following the fall of the Soviet
Union.
59. Id. at 531-35 (detailing telephone conversations with SovietPresident Gorbachev after
a failed coup attempt against Gorbachev in August 1991).
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democracy.60 Notably, during the August 1991 coup attempt
against Gorbachev, the democratic reform movement in the
former Soviet Union enjoyed widespread support in the
international community."' Shortly after the failed coup attempt, in
September 1991, the United States recognized the independence of
the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), and Byelorussia
(later renamed Belarus)."2 By September 1991, with the demise of
the Soviet Union essentially assured, the U.S. national security
team turned its attention to the problem of the existing Soviet
nuclear arsenal.' Thus, the U.S. leadership was in the difficult
situation of wanting to support reform and democracy in the Soviet
Union, while being deeply concerned about the strategic instability
a Soviet breakup-the logical conclusion to the reform movement-
could bring.
To address the dueling policy objectives of supporting the reform
movement and encouraging stability, the U.S. State Department,
under the leadership of Secretary James Baker, devised a six-
principle scheme for the projected breakup of the Soviet Union." On
60. Id. at 527 (quoting President George H.W. Bush's personal diary from August 19,
1991) (while the coup attempt against Gorbachev was ongoing). Bush writes:
What I'd like to see is a return of Gorbachev, and a continuous movement for
democracy. I'm not quite sure I see how to get there ... . This new crowd [the
leaders of the coup] is hard-line and they're communists.... Myview is that the
forces of democracy have been unleashed, they can't be set back, and so we've got
to hope for and try to effect the return of Gorbachev and the forward movement
of democracy.
Id.
61. Id at 530 (quoting President George H.W. Bush as telling Boris Yeltsin, a champion
of Gorbachev during the coup attempt and the future leader of Russia, that "[pleople
throughout the world are supporting you, except Iraq, Libya, and Cuba .... People are
supporting you more that you can understand.").
62. Id. at 537-39 (noting that President George H.W. Bush recognized the independence
of the Baltic states onSept. 2, 1991).
63. Id. at 542 (describing then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Cohn L. Powell as
being concerned about the command and control of Soviet nuclear weapons in the aftermath
of a Soviet breakup).
64. See id. at 543-44. (describing a scheme of five principles plus one [hereinafter the
Baker Principles], in the mold of G.H.W. Bush's earlier reaction to German reunification).
Under the leadership of then-Secretary of State James Baker, these principles included:
"[SIelf determination through democratic methods; respect for existing borders, with any
changes made through negotiation; respect for democracy and the rule of law; respect for
human rights; adherence to international law and the USSR's existing treaty obligations;. -
[and] central control over nuclear weapons, [with] safeguards against internal or external
proliferation." Id. (emphasis added).
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the eve of the breakup of the Soviet Union, the first Bush
Administration announced that it would expect any and all states
resulting from such a breakup to honor pre-existing Soviet
international agreements, and that it expected centralized control
of the Soviet nuclear arsenal.' As discussed infra, these demands
may or may not be in concert with recognized international treaty
succession law.66 The Baker principles, however, represented a not-
so-subtle admission by the first Bush Administration that the
United States would also be bound by agreements made with the
former Soviet Union, in the event of a breakup. Stated differently,
the United States could not demand that the states resulting from
the Soviet Union's breakup be bound by the Soviet Union's
agreements, while contemporaneously proclaiming the United
States as not bound by those agreements. On December 21, 1991,
the Soviet Union officially dissolved into a Commonwealth of
Independent States, and, in keeping with the Baker Principles,
Russia assumed the international obligations of the former Soviet
Union.6 The first Bush Administration had succeeded in facilitating
a peaceful transition of the former Soviet Union. They were left,
however, with potentially destabilizing changes in the international
relations arena, the likes of which had not been seen in nearly eight
decades.'
65. Id at 544.
66. See infra notes 80-91 and accompanying text (discussing the "universal" and "clean
slate" succession doctrines of treaty succession).
67. Text of Accords by Former Soviet Republics Setting Up a Commonwealth, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 23, 1991, at A10.
68. BUSH & ScowcRoFr, supra note 58, at 564. G.H.W. Bush's National Security Advisor
Brent Scowcroft noted that:
The world we had encountered in January 1989 had been defined by superpower
rivalry. The Cold War struggle had shaped our assumptions about international
and domestic politics, our institutions and processes, our armed forces and
military strategy. In a blink of an eye, these were gone. We were suddenly in a
unique position, without experience, without precedent, and standing alone at
the height of power. It was, it is, an unparalleled situation in history.
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Treaty Succession under U.S. Constitutional Law: Is Recognition
by the Executive Enough?
As a matter of international treaty succession law, the recognition
of the continuing duties embodied by the Baker Principles may have
been sufficient to bind the United States and the states of the
former Soviet Union.69 As a matter of U.S. constitutional law,
however, mere recognition of a successor state by the executive
branch is not enough.70 In shaping the treaty power, the Framers,
as discussed infra, sought a balance of power by demanding that
treaties be ratified by the president after being "advised for
ratification" by two-thirds of the Senate. 1 Significantly, the Senate
did not offer its "Advice and Consent" as to the binding nature of the
ABM Treaty after the fall of the Soviet Union 72 That constitutional
deficiency caused the ABM Treaty to effectively cease to exist upon
the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.7" Furthermore, at least
one commentator has urged that recognition by the G.H.W. Bush
executive branch was not "even close" to being adequate to bind the
United States to the treaty, stating that "[oin substantive changes
69. See discussioninfra notes 80-91 and accompanyingtext (discussingthe ways successor
states to treaties are recognized pursuant to the "clean slate" doctrine).
70. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text (discussing the framework and
allocation of the "treaty power" pursuant to the U.S. Constitution).
71. Id.
72. R. James Woolsey, WhatABM Treaty?, WASH. POST, Aug. 15,2000, atA23. The author
is an attorney with Shea & Gardner in Washington, D.C. Additionally, Director Woolseywas
a member of the SALT I delegation staff, and the former Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency. In the article, he noted that the Senate did not vote to re-ratify the ABM Treaty in
regards to the Russian Federation after the fall of the Soviet Union. Director Woolsey
reiterated this position at a lecture at the Marshall-Wythe School of Law at the College of
William and Mary on February 12, 2001, and again in a July 2001 editorial for USA Today,
in which he stated that "[t]he 1972 treaty is worse than irrelevant to the strategic needs of
this new world; it is harmful...." R. James Woolsey, Let's Just MoveAhead, USATODAY, July
24, 2001, at 11A.
73. Woolsey, What ABM Treaty?, supra note 72, at A23. Director Woolsey notes that,
although the President should consider the views of Russia as well as U.S. allies concerning
the implementation of a national missile defense system, the President
need not, indeed he should not, do so from the disadvantaged position that he
will have to abrogate [the ABM Treaty] before he proceeds to deployment....
Unless some president submits the 1972 ABM Treaty, with its new parties, to
the Senate and obtains its consent to the substantive changes, there is nothing
to abrogate.
Id. (emphasis added).
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in treaties, the executive cannot act for the United States by itself.
The Constitution requires the consent of two-thirds of the Senate,"
and that "it is impossible to make the argument-with a straight face
that the changes (following the downfall of the Soviet Union) are not
'substantive.' 7 4
The importance of the Senate's role in the treaty power has been
widely discussed. In discussing the ongoing debate concerning
congressional-executive agreements, one commentator noted that:
[T]he Treaty Clause ... provides Article II authority for the
President and the Senate together to exercise broader foreign
affairs power than that delegated to Congress in Article I,
section 8 [of the U.S. Constitution]. There is thus no reason to
imagine ... that Congress may effectuate ... the sorts of
alterations in the relationships between the United States and
foreign sovereigns that the President and the Senate may
effectuate [by treatymaking] under Article II [the treaty
power] .75
Here, Professor Tribe addressed the limits on congressional power
due to the plain meaning of the treaty power. These same
limitations apply to the executive branch, in that the president
cannot act, pursuant to the plain meaning of the Treaty Clause,
without the consent of a supermajority of the Senate.
Implicit in these constitutional arguments is that the ABM Treaty
is somehow "different" after the fall of the Soviet Union, and thus,
should be subject to a vote by the Senate. The reinterpretation
efforts of the Reagan Administration shed light on this issue.78 With
the Reagan Administration pushing for a broad interpretation of the
ABM Treaty, the Senate defended its earlier understanding of the
treaty.7 7 This defense was a recognition that, if the executive has the
ability to reinterpret the treaty ratification of the Senate, the
Senate's treaty power is largely vitiated. Similarly, under G.H.W.
Bush, the executive strayed from the original intent of the Senate's
74. I&
75. Tribe, supra note 47, at 1260-61.
76. Chayes & Chayes, supra note 5.
77. HENxN, supra note 45, at 183 (noting that t]he ABM confrontation was
unprecedented, but it was perhaps an inevitable consequence of our unique, complex treaty
process, involving independent, powerful, constitutionally-based institutions").
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ratification of the ABM Treaty by recognizing the successor states
to the Soviet Union.
APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL TREATY SUCCESSION LAW TO THE
POST-1991 ABM TREATY
The above analysis demonstrates that the validity of the ABM
Treaty, as a matter of U.S. constitutional law, is questionable in the
post-1991 setting. In addition to the constitutional concerns, there
are two applicable international law theories that apply to the ABM
treaty debate. These theories are the clean slate doctrine of state
treaty succession law, 8 and the doctrine of changed circumstances
embodied in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 9
The Clean Slate Doctrine of Treaty Succession Law
International treaty succession law addresses the issue of
whether an agreement between two sovereigns should have effect
beyond the life of one of its parties. This relates to the view of a
sovereign nation as an international person, with the inherent
ability to make agreements on its own behalf.'o What happens when
one of these international persons ceases to exist?
The principle of treaty succession law known as the clean slate
doctrine addresses the death of the sovereign state. This principle
holds that "[wihen part of a state becomes a new state, the new
state does not succeed to the international agreements to which the
predecessor state was party, unless, expressly or by implication, it
accepts such agreements and the other party or parties thereto agree
or acquiesce."1 This definition makes sense in that it would not bind
a predecessor state's treaty partner (in the case of the ABM Treaty,
the United States) to a pre-existing treaty once the predecessor
state no longer exists. Although it has not been widely adopted, the
78. See infra notes 80-91 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 92-124 and accompanying text (discussing the doctrine of "changed
circumstances" as it applies to the break-up of the Soviet Union).
80. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text (describing the sovereign nation as an
"international person7 with the inherent authority to enter into treaties and other
agreements).
81. RESATEMENT (TmIE) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 210
(1987) (emphasis added).
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1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of
Treaties attempted to make two exceptions to the clean slate
doctrine. Namely, the 1978 Vienna Convention excepted treaties
establishing boundaries and territorial regimes, and those imposing
restrictions on a territory for the benefit of another State.12 It is
important to note that neither the United States nor the former
Soviet Union signed the 1978 Vienna Convention,' and in any event
its purported exceptions are not directly applicable to the ABM
Treaty debate.
The above explanation of the clean slate doctrine leads to the
question of whether the United States agreed or acquiesced to the
succession to the ABM Treaty by the successor states to the Soviet
Union." An analysis of the G.H.W. Bush response to the fall of the
Soviet Union indicates that the executive branch did agree to such
a succession, and in fact encouraged such succession through the
Baker Principles.' As discussed infra, this recognition by the
executive branch is not per se sufficient under the U.S. Constitution
to bind the United States to the post-1991 ABM treaty. The
constitutional issue, however, is separate and distinct from whether
recognition by the executive (here, G.H.W. Bush) has binding effect
in an international sense. The international community does not
necessarily care about the nuances of U.S. constitutional law, but
rather whether the United States has effectively recognized the
succession of the states emerging from the former Soviet Union to
Soviet treaty obligations. As a matter of international law generally,
an executive's recognition of a successor state to a treaty would be
sufficient for the continued existence of the treaty with its reciprocal
duties. In the international arena, "a state representative may
conclude a treaty on behalf of a state if he possesses 'full powers."86
82. 1978 Vienna Convention of Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, Aug. 22,1978
art. 11, 12, 17 I.L.L 1488, 1494-95; see also SEVA TIM, supra note 41.
83. Woolsey, What ABM Treaty?, supra note 72, at A23 (further noting that "90 percent
of the world's states have refused to sign it [the 1978 convention]. It is irrelevant to the ABM
Treaty debate.").
84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 210
(1987).
85. See supra notes 55-66 and accompanying text (discussing the first Bush
Administration's attempts to ensure a peaceful and orderly transition from the former Soviet
Union to its successor states).
86. REBECCA M.M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 222 (2d ed. 1992).
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"Heads of State, governments and foreign affairs ministers are
regarded as possessing by virtue of their office 'full powers."87 Thus,
George H.W. Bush, or even his Secretary of State, James Baker,
could unilaterally recognize the existence of the successor states to
the Soviet Union and their continuing duties under the ABM
Treaty. This situation illuminates a tension between U.S.
constitutional law and international law concerning the binding
effect of treaties. Although there has been much debate on this
subject, the prevailing notion is that "the Treaty Power does not
extend 'so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids. ,8
Professor Henkin further notes that "Ccngress has always assumed
that there were limits on the Treaty Power," and that even "[tihe
treaty-makers themselves [executive branch officials] have thought
they were subject to limitations." 9 The defining statement on the
tension between the U.S. Constitution and the treaty power came
from Justice Hugo Black in Reid v. Covert" in 1957. In Reid, Justice
Black noted that "no agreement with a foreign nation can confer
power on the Congress, or on any other branch of Government,
which is free from the restraints of the Constitution."91 Although
Justice Black was concerned with the content of treaties as related
to the U.S. Constitution, his reasoning is equally applicable to the
creation of treaties. Justice Black recognized that, as in the case of
the ABM Treaty, the executive, as well as Congress, must play
inside the lines drawn by the Framers concerning the treaty power.
The Fundamental Changes in the Former Soviet Union, As Well
As the Rising Threat from "Rogue' States, Allow the United States
to Revisit the ABM Treaty.
The authors of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
accepted the premise that, in some instances, evolving
circumstances would make it untenable for one party to a treaty to
87. Id-
88. HENKIN, supra note 45, at 187 (quoting Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1980)).
Professor Henkin, in addition to writing widely on the interrelationship of international law
and the U.S. Constitution, was the Chief Reporter of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States.
89. Id.
90. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
91. Id. at 16.
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remain bound by the treaty.92 In the twenty-nine years since the
implementation of the ABM Treaty, numerous changes in the
international nuclear and military balance of power have occurred.
These changes have effectively rendered the rationale for the ABM
Treaty obsolete.9"
Status of the Soviet Threat in 1972
The late 1960s and early 1970s saw an expansion of Soviet
military and political strength under the leadership of Leonid
Brezhnev.9' While expanding the influence of the Soviet Union,
along with its military might, Brezhnev's regime maintained strict
civilian control over the military by utilizing both the Ministry of
Internal Affairs and the KGB.9" Documentation prepared by the
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) from the period leading up
to the ABM Treaty showed that [iln the course of the past 10 years
[1960-19701, the Soviets have engaged in a vigorous and costly
buildup" of their "intercontinental attack forces"--that is, weaponry
capable of reaching the U.S. mainland. 6 The CIA determined the
92. 1969 Vienna Convention, supra note 28, art. 62(1) (a) & (b) (indicating that a
fundamental change of circumstances may be invoked as a ground for terminating or
withdrawing from the treaty if "the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential
basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty;, and the effect of the change is
radically to transform the extent of obligations still to be performed under the treaty").
93. See, e.g., The Future of the ABM Treaty: Hearing Before the International Security
Proliferation, and Federal Services Subcommittee of the Committee on Governmental Affairs,
106th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter The Future of the ABM Treaty] (statement of Ambassador
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and Professor of
Government at Georgetown University). Ambassador Kirkpatrick noted that:
As we all know, the ABM treaty was conceived and ratified as a bilateral treaty
during a time that only the United States and the Soviet Union had the capacity
to reach the other's territory with ballistic missiles. Whether the treaty
contributed to America's security even then, is a question for historians with
which we need not be concerned today. The question that concerns us now is
whether the ABM treatycontributes to the security ofthe United States today....
I believe the answer is, "No, the Treaty does not contribute to our security
today.-
Id- at5.
94. MARTIN MCCAUUY, THE SOVIET UNION 1917-1991, at 286-344 (2d ed. 1993) (noting
that the "Soviet Union was expanding her influence in the Third World" and that the "USSR
took full advantage of US discomfiture in South East Asia").
95. Id.
96. SovietForcesforlntercontinentalAttack, in INTENTIONSAND CAPABILTs: ESTIMATES
ON SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES, 1950-1983, at 263 (Donald P. Steury ed., 1996). This is a
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reasons for the Soviet buildup of the intercontinental attack forces
in general and the intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
specifically was to match and surpass the number of U.S. ICBMs, in
the hopes that many would survive an initial U.S. attack. 7
Although the raw numbers from this period representing the Soviet
ability to deliver a nuclear strike to the continental United States
might seem uninformative when viewed out of context, they are
nonetheless staggering. According to CIA documents, the Soviet
Union had "an estimated 1,527 ICBM launchers... 516 submarine-
launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, and 195 heavy
bombers and tankers" in 1971."8 Each of these weapon systems
could potentially deliver a nuclear warhead to the continental
United States, thus triggering the beginning of the "Mutually
Assured Destruction" scenario. 99
The Soviet Union saw primacy in the arms race with the United
States in the early 1970s as vital to its very existence.1° This
attitude manifested itself in a massive Soviet nuclear arsenal
compilation of formerly top secret CIA documents outlining the capabilities of the Soviet
military, with special emphasis placed on the Soviet ability to attack the U.S. mainland
through the use of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The CIAreport notes that "[flor
the decade as a whole, spending on intercontinental attack forces accumulated to about 16
billion rubles (about $36 billion) with ICBM's accounting for about 80 percent of this amount."
Id. at 263-64.
97. Id. at 268. This Soviet buildup was a result of classic arms race mentality of the two
hegemonic superpowers during this era. As the CIA report noted, the Soviet leaders
perceived that... their military forces [and particularly their ICBM capabilities
were conspicuously inferior to those of their most dangerous rival, the U.S.
Consequently, they set themselves to rectify the imbalance-to achieve at a
minimum a relation of rough parity. Parity in this sense cannot be objectively
measured; it is essentially a state of mind.
Id. at 267 (emphasis added).
The doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction, see John Yoo, Review Essay: Politics as
Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, The Separation of Powers, and Treaty Interpretation,
89 CAL. L. Rv. 851, 852 (2001), explains why the CIA refers to "parity" of this nature as a
"state of mind." If, for instance, the Soviet Union had the ability to launch either a first strike
or a counterattack that would destroy the North American continent, this is "actual parity,"
despite the fact that the United States may have had more pure numbers of ICBMs.
98. Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack, supra note 96, at 312.
99. Yoo, supra note 97, at 852.
100. Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack, supra note 96, at 254 (noting that "[for
several years [leading up to 1971], the primary objectives of Soviet strategic policy have
evidently been to build a more formidable deterrent and to overcome the U.S. lead in
capabilities for intercontinental attack"). The author goes on to note that as of 1971 the Soviet
Union had "overtaken the US in numbers of operational ICBM launchers." Id
20011 U.S.-SOVIETABM TREATY 809
during an era in which over one-third of all Soviet citizens lived
below the poverty line.' 1 Not surprisingly, the Cold War Soviet
military dominated the Soviet domestic policy landscape. 10
2
The United States Would Not Have Signed the ABM Treaty in
1972 had the Soviet Union Resembled the Modern Russian
Federation.
The Russian transition to democracy since December 1991 has
been a rocky one.' When considering the changed circumstances
contemplated by the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties' as applicable to the ABM Treaty, the changes in the
Russian military are of paramount importance. At present, there is
great concern about the level of control Russia has over the nuclear
arsenal of the former Soviet Union. 05 Outward signs substantiate
these concerns, as several high-profile accidents have befallen the
Russian military in recent years. In May of 1998, a Russian nuclear
submarine suffered a serious accident and caught fire in the
101. See MARTIN MCCAULEY, supra note 94, at 297 (noting that "[i]f aper capita income of
50 rubles per month was needed in 1967 to stay above the poverty line in the Soviet Union
then 37.7 percent of individuals and 32.5 percent of families in that year failed to attain this
level and hence were in need") (citing ALASTAIR MCAULEY, ECONOMIC WELFARE INTHE SOVIET
UNION: POVERTY, LIVING STANDARDS, AND INEQUALIlY 58 (1979)).
102. Id at 373 (noting that the "Brezhnev economy was one in which thousands of sub-
economies functioned .... The major force was the military-industrial complex, which had
first call on resource allocation.").
103. For an overall view of the transformation process of the former Soviet Union, see
generally Ian Richard Brown, Clinging to Democracy: Assessing the Russian Legislative-
Executive Relationship Under Boris Yeltsin's Constitution, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 645
(2000); Todd Alan Frommeyer, Power Sharing Treaties in Russia's Federal System, 21 Loy.
L. . INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (1999); Kim Lane Scheppele, The Inevitable Corruption of
Transition, 14 CONN. J. INTL L. 509 (1999); Paul B. Stephan, Rationality and Corruption in
the Post-Socialist World, 14 CONN. J. IWI L. 533 (1999).
104. 1969 Vienna Convention, supra note 28, art. 62.
105. The Future of the ARM Treaty, supra note 93 (statement of John B. Rhinelander,
Former Legal Advisor to the SALT I delegation). Mr. Rhinelander notes that
the single most important threat now is the Russian strategic systems. These
are the only ones that could destroy the United States. They could destroy us
utterly, we know that, with only a fraction of the ones they still have working.
... The loose nuke problem with the Russian tactical system is very real. I think
our people aren't sure the Russians know where all their systems are.
Id at 14.
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Barents Sea carrying 12 ballistic missiles.' ° In 2000, the
unexplained sinking of the Russian submarine "Kursk" caused some
to again question the ability of Russia to "protect itself against its
own weapons and an incompetent leadership."'0 7 In June of 2000,
President Clinton, due to Russia's inability to properly convert
"highly enriched uranium," which had been extracted from its
nuclear weapons, into "low enriched uranium," for use in com-
mercial reactors, issued an Executive Order declaring a national
emergency in order to deal with the situation.' One particularly
shocking report described a Russian submarine base where, for
various reasons, unused nuclear fuel could not be removed from
dormant submarines."° This created a situation where the nuclear
fuel had to be constantly cooled via an "air conditioner-like
device."" A crisis ensued after a Russian power company turned off
the Navy's power supply to the base because of past due bills."' A
catastrophic nuclear event was averted, however, by the local
Russian Navy commander, who visited a local power company
official and threatened him at gunpoint, forcing the power company
to reactivate the Navy's power." The crumbling of Russia's
infrastructure has been well documented in the United States and
international press." In a recent special report entitled "A Survey
of Russia," The Economist described these bleak conditions, stating
that"[mlost of what the Soviet Union built was shoddy to start with,
but modern Russia lacks the money and willpower to sustain even
106. Leonard M. Salter, Predictions For the Next Millenium, 42 FEB. ORANGE COUNTYLAW.
16 (noting that the aging Russian submarine fleet is "deteriorating rapidly, improperly
maintained by an increasingly poor and hungry Russian Navy").
107. Jim Hoagland, The Wrong Debate on the Military, WASH. POST, Aug. 24,2000, at A25
(further noting that the "Russians [are] ... grappling with the reality of a military truly in
decline").
108. See H.R. Doc. No. 106-259, at 1 (2000) (containing a message to Congress from former
President Clinton explaining the gravity of the situation, as well as a copy of the Executive
Order).
109. The World (Public Radio International Broadcast Dec. 1, 2000).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See, e.g., Carey Goldberg, Russia's Doctors Are Beggars At Work, Paupers at Home,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,2000, at Al; Michael Wines, An AilingRussia LivesA Tough Life That's
Getting Shorter, N.Y. TZMES, Dec. 3, 2000, at Al; Abigail Zuger, Infectious Diseases Rising
Again in Russia, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 5, 2000, at Al. These articles appeared as a series of front-
page stories and chronicled the difficulties facing the Russian populace.
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that unimpressive standard. As a result, the country is falling
apart.""' Such is the current situation in Russia; it has been
described as having the "infrastructure of a third-world nation"
while attempting to deal with the nuclear legacy of a superpower."'
Having established that the Russian military is, at the least,
more unstable and unpredictable than at the time of the signing of
the ABM Treaty, the issue becomes whether this instability is
sufficient as a matter of law to allow the United States to withdraw
from the treaty pursuant to the changed circumstances doctrine.'
The changed circumstances doctrine has two requirements. First,
the existence of the original circumstances must constitute an
essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the
treaty; stated differently, the parties would not have entered into
the treaty had the original conditions not existed."7 The second
requirement is that the effect of the changed circumstances must
radically transform the extent of obligations still to be performed
under the treaty."8
The first requirement is relatively easily satisfied, if one accepts
the premise that President Nixon and the United States agreed to
forego a national missile defense program in return for the
assurance that the Soviet Union, in all of its military splendor of the
early 1970s, would do the same. Since the change here involves the
very existence of the Soviet Union, the first prong of the changed
circumstances doctrine is satisfied. What could be more of an
essential basis of the consent of the United States to be bound by
the ABM Treaty than the very existence, in its 1972 form, of the
Soviet Union?"1
The second requirement of the changed circumstances doctrine is
a closer question. Have the changed circumstances "radically ...
transform[ed] the ... obligations" of the United States under the
114. Edward Lucas, A Survey of Russia, ECONOMIST July 21, 2001, at 3 of special report
beginning after page 46. Lucas notes that "[t]o reach the level of prosperity that even one of
the poorer members of the European Union ... enjoys today, on a crude calculation Russia
would need to grow by 8% a year for the next 15 years." Id. at 4 of special report.
115. Public Radio International Broadcast, supra note 109.
116. See 1969 Vienna Convention, supra note 28, art. 62 (1).
117. Id. art. 62(1) (a).
118. Id. art. 62(1) (b).
119. Id. art. 62(1) (a).
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ABM Treaty?12 To determine this, the text of the ABM treaty must
be revisited to discern the obligations of the United States under the
treaty. The ABM Treaty places several obligations on its parties.
Specifically, neither party to the treaty could deploy anti-ballistic
missile systems for a defense of the territory of its country, with the
exception of a limited ABM capability in the 150-kilometer radius
around the respective capital cities of the two nations (Moscow and
Washington, D.C.) or around a single ICBM site.'2 1 The United
States could undoubtedly physically continue to comply with these
terms. Thus, the issue turns on the meaning of the phrase "radically
... transform" in the second requirement of the changed
circumstances doctrine. 22 The International Court of Justice
addressed this issue in Fisheries Jurisdiction,' in which the court
held that '[tihe change must have increased the burden of the
obligations to be executed to the extent of rendering the
performance something essentially different from that originally
undertaken."' Framed in this fashion, U.S. compliance with the
ABM Treaty in the twenty-first century does look like "rendering
the performance" of "something essentially different" than U.S.
compliance with the ABM Treaty in 1972 (and arguably up to the
fall of the Soviet Union in 1991).'
This essential difference arises not directly out of the United
States' physical compliance with the ABM Treaty, but from its
compliance in the context of the changes in the former Soviet Union
and in the modern international community. The world is no longer
dominated by two hegemonic nuclear powers in opposition; rather,
in the modern international community, many more nations have
or are working towards nuclear weapons capabilities. As noted by
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, the former U.S. Ambassador to the United
Nations,
in addition to the ballistic missile threats posed by Russia and
... China, such states as Iran, Iraq and North Korea will
120. Id. art. 62(1) (b).
121. ABM Treaty, supra note 1, art. III (a)(b).
122. 1969 Vienna Convention, supra note 28, art. 62(1) (b).
123. REBECCA M.M. WALLACE, INTENATIONAL LAW, 236-37 (2d ed. 1992) (citing Fisheries
Jurisdiction (Ice v. U.K- & F.R.G.), 1973 I.C.J. 3).
124. Id. at 119.
125. Id.
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probably be able to inflict major damage on the United States
within about 5 years of a decision to acquire such a capability....
What makes the recent spread of nuclear and missile
technology especially serious is that it puts weapons of mass
destruction in the hands of repressive one-party states-the very
governments that are most likely to use such weapons
aggressively.e
This rise of the rogue state nuclear threat is clearly a major concern
with the G.W. Bush Administration, and is one of the
administration's main selling points of its missile defense plan.
Administration officials and commentators have voiced concerns in
which they are, in essence, arguing that the rise of the rogue state
nuclear threat constitutes a change in circumstances so great as to
require the United States to move forward with a missile defense
system.12
126. The Future of the ABM Treaty, supra note 93, at 4.
127. Id.; see also Bush Team Sees U.S. Withdrawal From ABM Pact, LA. TIMS, July 12,
2001, at Al, All (quoting "White House officials7 as stating that they "intend to develop
antimissile systems that will protect the United States from a small-scale attack by rogue'
nations"); For the Record, WASH. POST, July 26, 2001, at A24 (quoting from testimony of
William Schneider, Jr., chairman of the Defense Science Board at the Department of Defense,
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
The ABM Treaty was developed to regulate the strategic nuclear competition
between the United States and the former Soviet Union in a bipolar policy
environment of intense reciprocal animosity.
At thetime... [tihe shared nonproliferation interests of the major nuclear states
imparted a powerful disincentive to the transfer of ballistic missile technology
to other nations.
None of these conditions [exists] today. ... Containing the proliferation of
ballistic missiles is now out of reach using the diplomatic instruments of the
Cold War. New instruments must be found.
Ballistic missiles can be found in the arsenals of many of the states with the
most profoundly hostile relationship [sic] with the United States, including
North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya.
Frank J. Gaffney, Does the U.S. Need to Build a Missile Defense? Yes: Nation Needs Insurance
Against A Surprise Attack, DALL. MORN. NEWS, July 22,2001, at 1J (author was the head of
missile defense policy during the Reagan Administration, and notes that an American missile
defense system would target the increasing missile capabilities of "such rogue states as Iran,
Iraq, Libya, Syria, Pakistan and Sudan," as well as China and North Korea); R. James
Woolsey, Let's Just Move Ahead, supra note 72, at 1A (noting that "the technology and
components for ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction are continuing to spread
rapidly to a substantial number of nations, several of them bitter U.S. enemies," and later
specifying these nations: "North Korea, Iraq, and Iran).
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Requiring the United States to continue to comply with the ABM
Treaty within the context of the current international climate, with
special emphasis being placed on the dissolution of the Soviet Union
and the poor state of the Russian military in combination with the
rise of the rogue state nuclear threat, constitutes an essential
difference of the type contemplated by the International Court in
Fisheries Jurisdiction."2 8
POLICY DEBATE
The above analysis makes the case that the United States is not
legally bound by the ABM Treaty, for either U.S. constitutional law
reasons in conjunction with the clean slate doctrine of treaty
succession law, 9 or the doctrine of changed circumstances, as set
forth in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.1 30
However, this is not the end of the ABM debate. There are factors
that might lead the United States to acquiesce to a treaty that is not
legally binding. This section will discuss some of these reasons, as
well as introduce policy reasons in favor of a U.S. missile defense
shield.
In June of 2000, as President Clinton was considering whether to
go forward with implementation of a national missile defense
program, a group of prominent international scholars made public
a letter to the President urging him not to go forward with the
plan." The group voiced their concern that the missile defense
system would "pose an implicit threat to Russia's deterrent force,"
and they noted that "Russian military analysts consider this an
unacceptable risk."32 Russia, for its part, sees implementation of a
U.S. missile defense system as a blatant violation of the letter and
128. WALLACE, supra note 123.
129. See supra notes 80-91 and accompanying text (analysis concerningwhythe clean slate
doctrine of treaty succession should apply to the ABM Treaty following the fall of the Soviet
Union).
130. See supra notes 92-128 and accompanying text (discussing the profound changes in
the circumstances surrounding the signing of the ABM Treaty and the current international
climate).
131. Group Urges President to BarfMissileDefense: Plan Termed 'Implicit Threat' to Russia,
WASH. Posr, June 13, 2000, at A4 (naming members of the group, including Timothy Colton
and Marshall Goldman of Harvard, Robert Legvold of Columbia, and David Holloway of
Stanford).
132. Id.
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spirit of the ABM Treaty," although, as noted supra, they have
recently softened this stance somewhat."3 4
Another concern with the United States implementing a national
missile defense plan is that it would cause a nuclear power vacuum
as to all other states, with the United States impervious to nuclear
attack. Domestic political concerns include threats from prominent
Congressional Democrats, including the Chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, Carl Levin, to use Congress's power of
the purse to disallow spending for research and testing for national
missile defense, which they determine to be in violation of the ABM
Treaty. 5 Other commentators have argued that the ABM Treaty
should not be scrapped because it is an intricate part of an arms-
control regime that "prevented nuclear war and helped create
conditions that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union."3 6 Recent
evidence shows that the decision to go forward with the national
missile defense plan will likely be unpopular in the international
community, many nations will undoubtedly not make the deter-
mination that the United States is not bound by the ABM Treaty,
and instead would view a U.S. missile defense plan as an instance
of the United States breaking an international treaty.
Finally, there are selfish reasons why the G.W. Bush
Administration may eventually decline to go forward with a
national missile defense plan. Since the end of the Gulf War in
1991 and the fall of the Soviet Union later that same year, the
United States had, until the attacks on September 11, 2001, been
enjoying what is commonly referred to as a "peace dividend." Since
133. David Hoffman, Russian Criticizes U.S. Missile Plans: General Rejects ABM Treaty
Changes, WASH. PosT, May 5, 2000, at A21 (noting that "Russia has repeatedly expressed
opposition to ABM changes, saying they would undermine the entire arms control regime").
134. See supra note 21 (discussing the post G-8 meeting between Presidents Bush and
Putin at which they agreed to discuss the possible linkage between cuts in American nuclear
arsenals and the mutual abrogation of the ABM Treaty).
135. James Dao, Threat from Democrats on Missile Test Plans, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2001,
at A18 (detailing congressional opposition to the Pentagon's proposed missile defense test site
at Fort Greely, Alaska, and quoting Representatives John M. Spratt (D-SC), Ike Skelton (D-
MO), and Norman Dicks (D-WA) as stating in a letter to Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld that they "do not believe that it will strengthen our security to pull out of the ABM
treaty and rush unproven defenses to deployment"); Frank J. Gafflny, Jr., A Putin "Set-Up on
Missile Defense?, WASH. TIMES, July 24, 2001, at A18 (noting that Senator Levin has "made
known [his] determination to deny President Bush funds for developmental and testing
activities deemed incompatible with the ABM Treaty").
136. E.J. Dionne, Jr., Faith-Based Defense, WASH. POST, July 27,2001, at A31.
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September 11, the Bush Administration has been focused almost
singularly on responding to the attacks, resulting in a substantially
lower profile for the Missile Shield initiative. Additionally, in an
embarrassing turn of events for the Defense Department, during
early tests of missile interceptors to be used in the national missile
defense plan, the program failed in two of its first three tests. 7 The
testing program was buoyed, however, by a successful (if somewhat
contrived) missile interception test in July of 2001.138
The policy debate surrounding the ABM Treaty as it applies to a
national missile defense plan is by no means one-sided. The idea
that the United States is not bound by the ABM Treaty has been
generally well-received in the U.S. Senate." 9 Commentators from
outside the Senate have also weighed in supporting a national
missile defense plan, noting especially the increasing threat from so-
137. This was part of the calculus President Clinton used in deciding against the
implementation of a missile defense plan. The President, according to a senior administration
official, said that he "did not want to pay the big front-end costs if he was not sure this thing
would work." Roberto Suro, Woes Undermined Missile Defense Cause: Clinton Weighed Test
Failures, Development Delays in Addition to Diplomatic Costs, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2000, at
A4.
138. Transcript of Pentagon news briefing by Lieutenant General Ronald T. Kadish,
Director of the Pentagon's Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) (July 15, 2001), at
httpv/www.defenselink.minews/Jul200l/tO7152001_t7l4bmdo.html (detailingthe successful
missile defense test conducted on July 14, 2001).
139. The Future of the ABM Treaty, supra note 93, at 5 (testimony of Ambassador
Kirkpatrick); Iran and Proliferation: Is the U.S. Doing Enough? Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 105th Cong. (1997) (containing 108
pages of testimony outlining the extent to which Russia and China are arming Iran with
nuclear weapons); Urgent Need For Ballistic Missile Defense, Hearing Before Committee on
Foeign Relations, 104th Cong., at 1 (1996) (statement of Senator Helms, chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, calling the ABM Treaty an "obsolete arms control
agreement" and stating that it was an "absolute necessity" for the United States to withdraw
from the ABM Treaty. Senator Helms further noted that many of the nations currently with
operational ballistic missiles are "clearly hostile" to the United States, including Iran, Iraq,
Libya, Syria, and North Korea.); id. at 8 (statement of R. James Woolsey, former director of
the CIA, noting that "countries such as Iraq are no longer client states of the Soviet Union,
which does not exist anymore, and they are not even client states of Russia. They are doing
what they please."); S. REP. No. 106-4 (1999) (report from the Committee on Armed Services
reporting favorably on the National Missile Defense Act of 1999 (S. 257)). The Republican
party in the U.S. Senate is, by and large, firmly in support of the implementation of a
national missile defense system, as evidenced by the statement of Senator Jim Bunning of
Kentucky, who stated during a July 2001 hearing that "[sipending money to defend the
United States of America from intercontinental ballistic missiles ought to be the top priority
that we have." Vernon Loeb, Senate Democrats Blast Bush's Missile Defense Plan, WASH.
POST, July 13, 2001, at AS.
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called rogue states,4" as well as the rise of China as a nuclear
power."' Top Pentagon officials view the ABM Treaty as not
only obsolete, but dangerous to the security of the United
States."2 Additionally, as previously discussed, the G.W. Bush
Administration has come out strongly in favor of a national missile
defense, with the backing of several well-known leaders from both
sides of the aisle.'2
A SUGGESTION TO END THE UNCERTAINTY
Senator Thad Cochran aptly summed up the ongoing debate
surrounding the ABM Treaty by stating that the Treaty is "[c]alled
by some the cornerstone of strategic stability, and regarded by
others as an obselete relic of the Cold War."' Whichever side one
adopts in this public policy debate, the legal arguments on the
current viability of the ABM Treaty are critical. Commentators have
expressed the idea that the ABM.Treaty should be amended, and
that the United States should have negotiations with Russia to this
effect." 5 While these amendment arguments were appropriate
140. Barry L. RothbergAvertingArmageddon: PreventingNuclear Terrorism in the United
States, 8 DuKE J. Co P. & INTL'L. 79, 82 (1997) (noting that "[s]ince the collapse of the Soviet
empire, the likelihood of a nuclear attack at the United States has actually increased, and
quite substantially," and further noting that "seven countries are listed by the U.S. State
Department as sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and
Syria," and that "all but Cuba and Sudan are heavilyinvolved in suspicious nuclear activity").
141. Brian T. Kennedy, MAD vs. Missile Defense: How the ABM Treaty Undermines the
Security of The United States and its Allies, 4 NEXUS 99, 110 (1999) (noting that "Blacking
a missile defense, our only deterrent against these [nuclear] threats [from China, Russia and
North Korea] is our own threat of annihilating millions of people in Russia, China, North
Korea, and other potential nuclear aggressors").
142. E.g., Rowan Scarborough, Arms Tests to Stray From ABMPact, WASH. Tuis, July 13,
2001, at 4 (quoting Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz as stating in testimony before
the Senate Armed Services Committee that "[wihile we have been debating the existence of
the threat for nearly a decade, other countries have been busily acquiring, developing and
proliferating missile technology," and that "[thanks in no small part to the constraints of the
ABM Treaty we have wasted the better part of a decade. We cannot afford to waste another
one.").
143. See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text (noting that the G.W. Bush
Administration has signaled its intention of going forward with the plan, and noting the
support of Senators Lieberman and McCain, and former Secretary of State Kissinger).
144. The Future of the ABM Treaty, supra note 93, at 1.
145. See, e.g., David Edward Grogan, Power Play: Theater Ballistic Missile Defense,
National Ballistic Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty, 39 VA. J. INL L. 799 (1999).
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during the Reagan Administration's SDI efforts, they ignore the
reality that, in a legal sense, the ABM Treaty has no binding effect
on either post-Soviet Union Russia or the post-Cold War United
States.1' For those who call the ABM Treaty a "cornerstone," it is
imperative that this "cornerstone" have actual legal effect on its
parties. For those who call the ABM Treaty a "relic," the arguments
that the treaty is not legally binding could serve as additional
support for a national missile defense plan.
For the reasons explained here, the ABM Treaty is not legally
binding on either the United States or Russia in 2001. The proper
way for the United States and Russia (with the possibility of
multilateral negotiations with nations which now have -or are
developing intercontinental nuclear capability) to settle this dispute
would be to renegotiate a new "2001 ABM Treaty," which would be
subject to the President's signature and the approval of two-thirds
of the U.S. Senate. By all appearances, the current Bush
Administration would oppose the proposal of a treaty similar to the
current ABM treaty. Thus, if the outright prohibition of missile
defense technology proved to be politically impractical, this new
treaty could offer alternatives, such as the international sharing of
ABM technology on some level. If the ABM Treaty is in fact a
"cornerstone" of international stability, a restrictive treaty of the
same type would undoubtedly be approved. If, on the other hand,
the treaty is a "relic" of the Cold War, a new restrictive treaty would
be rejected in favor of a less-restrictive regime. On a subject as
sensitive as national ballistic missile defense, the certainty which
would emerge from such a debate is of paramount national and
international importance.
James A Ewing
146. See supra notes 80-128 and accompanying text (discussions of the clean slate doctrine
and the changed circumstances doctrines).
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